As a result of a special operation in Rivne oblast, the SSU exposed an agent of the main directorate of the general staff of the russian armed forces (better known as the GRU).

The agent’s assignment was to carry out an act of sabotage at one of the key facilities of Rivne transport system.

In this way, the aggressor hoped to disrupt supply of foreign weapons for the Defence Forces on the eastern and southern fronts.

To carry out the attack, the saboteur arrived in Ukraine on February 19 posing as a resident of a European state. When crossing the state border, he used an EU passport.

After arriving in Rivne region, the man conducted reconnaissance near a strategic transport artery to determine where to place the explosive device.

The saboteur was recorded entering the area, where he covertly examined the target and observed the frequency of rolling stock crossing the area.

His next step was to place the explosives in the most ‘vulnerable’ spot of the critical infrastructure facility and blow it up.

However, the SSU documented all the stages of the foreigner’s criminal activity and detained the saboteur when he was preparing to commit the crime.

According to the investigation, the suspect has a permanent residence permit in russia and is an agent of the russian military intelligence.

Since 2014, he has been carrying out enemy assignments against the ATO forces in eastern Ukraine. To do this, he joined the ‘oplot’ group and later the so-called ‘khan battalion’.

After the full-scale invasion began, the militant joined the ranks of the russian occupation grouping ‘Kherson’ and took an active part in warfare against Ukrainian troops on Zaporizhzhia and Kherson directions.

In September 2022, he returned to russia and was instructed to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage activity in the northwestern part of Ukraine.

His supervisor was a GRU officer, with whom he communicated through Telegram.

In addition to preparing for sabotage, the agent provided the enemy with intelligence on deployment of the Defense Forces units in Rivne region, including location of military enlistment offices.

Based on the collected evidence, SSU investigators served the detained agent a notice of suspicion. The court chose custody as a measure of restraint.

The SSU Office in Rivne region carried out the operation under the procedural supervision of the regional Prosecutor’s Office.