With the assistance of the Prosecutor General, the SSU Counterintelligence has thwarted an attempt by an agent of russian intelligence to infiltrate a Ukrainian government body. The enemy asset had been attempting to organise unofficial negotiations between the Ukrainian side and russian intelligence services regarding the peace agreement.

It has been established that the agent was coordinating his proposals directly with the leadership of the russian military intelligence agency – the GRU – and intended to impose them on Ukraine in the interests of the kremlin.

Among the demands made by him was his own appointment to a senior position, which would have given him the power to make decisions in the energy sector to russia’s benefit. It would also have enabled him to identify vulnerabilities in, and defence measures for, Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. This information could have been used to inflict maximum damage on our state.

To this end, the mole, an energy sector expert with experience of working in relevant enterprises, used his connections to promote his candidacy for key positions in Ukrainian energy companies.

However, the SSU Counterintelligence acted pre-emptively, documenting the perpetrator’s crimes and detaining him when he attempted to secure employment with one of these entities.

The investigation revealed that the suspect had come to the attention of the russians even before the start of the full-scale war. He was prepared to make his Kyiv apartment available to the russian intelligence services in the event of Kyiv’s capture.

His intelligence and subversive activities were coordinated by Rinat Amirov, an officer in the 9th directorate of the operational information department of the 5th service of russia’s federal security service.

The agent passed information about criminal proceedings in Ukraine’s energy sector to his russian handler. He had obtained this information through his contacts in law enforcement agencies.

The aim of the aggressor state was to carry out information subversion operations to discredit and have the energy sector leadership dismissed, so that their agent could be appointed in their place.

Subsequently, the traitor began working for russia’s military intelligence. His GRU handler was Aslanbek Aktemirov.

During the search of the suspect’s premises, a russian passport and a mobile phone containing evidence of his work for the enemy were found.

SSU investigators have notified the detainee of his status as a suspect under Article 111.1 of the CCU (high treason).

The suspect is in custody without bail and faces up to 15 years’ imprisonment and the confiscation of his property.

The operation was carried out under the procedural supervision of the Office of the Prosecutor General.