In Odesa, the SSU Counterintelligence has conducted a multi-stage special operation, which resulted in detention of another agent of the main directorate of the general staff of russian armed forces (better known as ‘the GRU’, a military intelligence agency).

The traitor passed targets for air strikes to the aggressor, identified locations and tracked movements of Ukrainian air defence units, reported on consequences of russian missiles and kamikaze drones hitting sites in the city.

According to the investigation, the enemy informant is a private lawyer who previously worked as an assistant to several members from the party of Shariy faction in a district council in Odesa region.

After russia’s full-scale invasion, he and his wife moved to the temporarily occupied Simferopol, where he applied to the ‘Crimea military commissariat’ at his own initiative.

There, the lawyer was recruited by Grigory Ivanov, a serving officer of the 3rd operational unit, GRU’s 316th intelligence centre. Ivanov worked undercover and introduced himself as an FSB officer.

The newly-recruited agent signed an agreement on covert cooperation for russia’s benefit and was assigned an operational name ‘Diezel’. The asset received a USD 500 ‘advance’ for conducting reconnaissance and sabotage against Ukraine. After that, he returned to Odesa to collect intelligence.

In the Ukrainian city, ‘Diezel’ also tried to establish contacts with local law enforcement officers, studying them as possible candidates for recruitment by russian intelligence.

The spy communicated with his handlers through an anonymous chat in a popular messenger app and deleted all data after each communication session.

Later, to arrange a cover for himself, he got a job in a local NGO involved in maintaining law and order in Odesa.

During the searches at the suspect’s home, the SSU found:

• mobile phones and electronic data carriers with evidence of the crime;
• weapons and ammunition.

Based on the evidence, SSU investigators served the detainee a notice of suspicion under Article 111.2 of the CCU (high treason committed under martial law).

The suspect is in custody, facing life imprisonment.

A notice of suspicion of espionage will be served to the agent’s russian handler. The SSU Counterintelligence has identified the GRU’s employee close operational contacts – another five russian military intelligence officers.

In addition, the SSU has identified the traitor’s wife, who now lives in St Petersburg and also cooperates with the GRU, receiving a monthly salary. The woman is administering a Telegram channel, which, on the enemy’s instructions, spreads fakes on the situation in Odesa.

The SSU is going to serve her a notice of suspicion of high treason.

The SSU Office in Odesa region carried out the operation under the procedural supervision of Odesa Region Prosecutor’s Office.